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Abstract
Information regarding object identity (‘‘what’’) and spatial location (‘‘where/how to’’) is largely segregated in
visual processing. Under most circumstances, however, object identity and location are linked. We report data
from a simultanagnosic patient (K.E.) with bilateral posterior parietal infarcts who was unable to ‘‘see’’ more
than one object in an array despite relatively preserved object processing and normal preattentive processing.
K.E. also demonstrated a finding that has not, to our knowledge, been reported: He was unable to report more
than one attribute of a single object. For example, he was unable to name the color of the ink in which words
were written despite naming the word correctly. Several experiments demonstrated, however, that perceptual
attributes that he was unable to report influenced his performance. We suggest that binding of object identity
and location is a limited-capacity operation that is essential for conscious awareness for which the posterior
parietal lobe is crucial.
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Simultanagnosia: When a Rose Is Not Red
H. Branch Coslett1,2 and Grace Lie
Abstract
& Information regarding object identity (‘‘what’’) and spatial lo-
cation (‘‘where/how to’’) is largely segregated in visual process-
ing. Under most circumstances, however, object identity and
location are linked. We report data from a simultanagnosic pa-
tient (K.E.) with bilateral posterior parietal infarcts who was un-
able to ‘‘see’’ more than one object in an array despite relatively
preserved object processing and normal preattentive processing.
K.E. also demonstrated a finding that has not, to our knowledge,
been reported: He was unable to report more than one attribute
of a single object. For example, he was unable to name the color
of the ink in which words were written despite naming the word
correctly. Several experiments demonstrated, however, that per-
ceptual attributes that he was unable to report influenced his
performance. We suggest that binding of object identity and loca-
tion is a limited-capacity operation that is essential for conscious
awareness for which the posterior parietal lobe is crucial. &
INTRODUCTION
Simultanagnosia, initially described by Balint (1909) as a
component of the syndrome that bears his name, is a
disorder characterized by the inability to see more than
one object at a time. Patients with this disorder typically
exhibit a striking deficit in apprehending the visual world.
When confronted with complex arrays such as a dinner
table laden with food and utensils, simultanagnosics will
often report seeing only a single item such as a fork.
Investigations of patients with simultanagnosia can pro-
vide important insights regarding the nature of nor-
mal visual perception and its neural basis (Robertson &
Treisman, 2006; Coslett & Chatterjee, 2003; Humphreys
& Riddoch, 2003). Here we address two major issues:
the manner in which spatial and object representations
are integrated and the relationship between perception
and awareness. The former issue, a major element of the
‘‘binding problem,’’ has a venerable history in cognitive
neuroscience (Treisman, 1998). Treisman’s Feature In-
tegration Theory (FIT) proposes that attention serves to
link visual features and location (see also Wolfe, 1994).
On this account, visual features such as angle, color,
and curvature are processed in different feature maps.
Feature maps are assumed to be linked to a representa-
tion of space, the ‘‘Master Map of Locations,’’ subserved
by the parietal lobes (Robertson, 2003; Treisman, 1998;
Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Directing attention to a lo-
cation at the Master Map of Locations serves to highlight
the corresponding location in the visual feature maps
with the consequence that the distinct features at that
location are linked to the same location. The attention-
requiring process of binding visual feature information
can be disrupted in normal subjects by reducing stimu-
lus presentation time or, in patients with brain dysfunc-
tion, by lesioning the parietal lobes (McCrea, Buxbaum, &
Coslett, 2006; Robertson & Treisman, 2006; Robertson,
Treisman, Friedman-Hill, & Grabowecky, 1997). One con-
sequence of this disruption is the production of ‘‘illusory
conjunction’’ errors in which visual features are miscom-
bined to produce a percept that is, in fact, not present
in the array. For example, McCrea et al. (2006) reported
that their patient, E.D., reported seeing a red T when
shown an array containing red ‘‘S’’s and green ‘‘T’’s (see
also Humphreys, Cinel, Wolfe, Olsen, & Klempen, 2000;
Friedman-Hill, Maldonado, & Gray, 1995). Although FIT
was developed to account for binding of visual informa-
tion in early vision, illusory conjunctions have also been
demonstrated with more complex stimuli such as letters
and even words. In the latter instance, letters may be mis-
located so that subjects report words not present in the
array (e.g., mean read as ‘‘amen’’; McCrea et al., 2006; see
also Robertson et al., 1997).
If the posterior parietal lobes represent the neural sub-
strate for the Master Map of Locations and this repre-
sentation is crucial for linking low-level visual feature
information, how can simultanagnosic subjects recognize
complex objects that are composed of multiple distinct
features in a precise spatial arrangement? One expla-
nation, originally proposed by Shalev and Humphreys
(2002), Humphreys et al. (2000), and Humphreys (1998),
appeals to the well-established distinction between the
dorsal and ventral visual pathways (Ungerleider & Miskin,
1982). On this proposal, the former, often designated
as the ‘‘where’’ or ‘‘how to’’ (Milner & Goodale, 1995)
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pathway, provides an egocentric spatial representation
that codes location in a manner appropriate for ac-
tion, whereas the latter, often designated as the ‘‘what’’
pathway, computes object identity. Although recogniz-
ing that spatial information is crucial for both systems,
Humphreys and colleagues suggested that the pathways
differ with respect to the manner in which spatial
information is employed; more specifically, they suggest
that the dorsal system computes the spatial relationship
between objects and the individual, whereas the
ventral system computes the spatial relationship be-
tween elements that constitute the object.
Although the distinction between processes computing
spatial relationships within and between objects offers
an account of the observation that patients may produce
illusory conjunctions at multiple levels of analysis—that
is, within letters, between letters, within words, and even
between words (Saffran & Coslett, 1996), the account
does not provide a ready explanation for the paradigmatic
deficit produced by simultanagnosic subjects: the inabil-
ity to report more than one object in an array. The find-
ing that simultanagnosic subjects often recognize only
one item in an array raises the possibility that, at least for
some patients with this disorder, the impairment reflects
a deficit in the binding of object representations (or struc-
tural descriptions) to spatial information; we previously
reported a patient with simultanagnosia for whom this ac-
count was offered (subject B.P.; Coslett & Saffran, 1991).
Here we report a simultanagnosic patient for whom
there was no clear evidence of a deficit in feature in-
tegration. Like B.P. (Coslett & Saffran, 1991), his per-
formance was influenced by the semantic relationship
between the items in an array; he reported both items
in two-item arrays more reliably if they were members
of the same semantic category. Consistent with the hy-
pothesis that binding of information computed in the
ventral and dorsal pathways is a capacity-limited proce-
dure, he exhibited a finding that has not, to our knowl-
edge, been reported previously: He was not only unable
to reliably report two objects, he was also unable to
report more than one attribute of the same object.
Finally, we demonstrate that the information about the
objects that he was unable to report (the color of the
word or line drawing) significantly influenced perfor-
mance. We suggest that binding of object and identity is a
limited-capacity operation that is essential for conscious
awareness.
Patient Description
The patient (K.E.) was a 58-year-old factory worker with
a high school education who noted the sudden onset of
an inability to ‘‘see’’ and difficulty in performing routine
tasks. K.E. had suffered an infarction of the left hemi-
sphere causing minor language problems and clumsi-
ness of the right hand 3 years prior to the investigations
reported here. He suffered a second stroke 1 year prior
to this testing. His symptoms had persisted without
significant change since the second stroke. When first
seen approximately 1 year after the onset of his simul-
tanagnosia, he was unable to direct his hands to a target;
on several occasions, he started fires when attempting to
snuff out cigarettes in an ashtray. He also stated that he
was frequently unable to find objects in an array; he was
typically unable to locate eating utensils and condiments
when eating. The data reported here were collected
over an interval of approximately 18 months, during
which there was little change in his behavior.
Neurologic examination revealed him to be fully ori-
ented. He manifested pyramidal clumsiness with both
hands but no significant weakness. K.E. exhibited promi-
nent misreaching to visualized targets (optic ataxia) with
both hands. Gait was slow with short steps. There was
no tactile or auditory extinction.
Assessment of visual processing revealed a visual acu-
ity of 20/30 OU. When instructed to look at the exam-
iner’s face without focusing attention, visual fields were
full to confrontation; when asked to focus attention on
the examiner’s nose, visual fields were restricted to ap-
proximately 308 concentrically with no evidence of a
scotoma or asymmetry. He exhibited inconsistent ex-
tinction to double simultaneous stimulation in the left
visual field. Ocular movements to command (e.g., look
to the door), as well as smooth and saccadic pursuit,
were normal in all directions.
Magnetic resonance imaging performed approximately
1 year after the onset of simultanagnosia revealed small
areas of infarction involving the left middle temporal gy-
rus, the left middle frontal gyrus, and a larger left posterior
parietal infarction. He had also suffered a right posterior
parietal hemorrhagic infarction. Nonspecific increased sig-
nal in the subcortical white matter of both hemispheres
was also noted on T2-weighted images (Figures 1 and 2).
Neuropsychological Examination
The neuropsychological assessment was limited by K.E.’s
optic ataxia as well as his inability to consciously process
more than one object at a time; the former prevented
him from responding reliably on tasks requiring a point-
ing response. Spoken language was relatively preserved.
He was fluent with an appropriate range of syntactic struc-
ture in spontaneous speech. Repetition of words and
sentences was normal. He exhibited mild word finding
problems in conversation and was slightly impaired in
naming single objects. He named 48/60 words on the
Boston Naming Test. There were three semantic errors,
four circumlocutions, and five instances in which he
named a part of the object. He description of the Cookie
Theft picture was slow and labored; after approximately
10 min of scrutiny, he reported six people in the picture,
apparently counting the girl thrice and the boy twice.
He never reported most of the objects in the array and
did not achieve a coherent understanding of the scene.
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He correctly read 58% (46/80) of the words from Sub-
test 31 of the Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language
Processing in Aphasia (Kay, Lesser, & Coltheart, 1992),
often in a slow, laborious fashion. Twenty-five errors
(74% of errors) were visually based (church read as
‘‘couch’’), five (15%) were reports of one or more letters
and four (12%) were omissions. On the latter trials, his
attention appeared to be captured by irrelevant aspect
of the stimulus (e.g., the corner of the card) and he was
unable to find the word. He read words of high im-
ageability (e.g., ‘‘tablet’’) better than words of low im-
ageability (e.g., ‘‘effort’’; 29/40 vs. 19/40), although the
difference was not significant. Nonword reading was
markedly impaired; he correctly pronounced only 3 of
50 four-letter nonwords. As has been reported in previous
investigations of simultanagnosic subjects, many errors
(66%) involved the report of one or more letters (Baylis,
Driver, Baylis, & Rafal, 1994; Coslett & Saffran, 1991); he
produced lexicalizations ( flig read as ‘‘flag’’) on 16 trials
(34% of errors). Unlike several previously reported sub-
jects (McCrea et al., 2006; Robertson & Treisman, 2006;
Robertson et al., 1997), he did not produce errors in
which letters in the array were reversed (e.g., was read as
‘‘saw’’) or rearranged (e.g., mean read as ‘‘amen’’).
K.E. reported only one of the overlapping figures for
seven of the nine Ghent figures; for two stimuli he failed
to identify any object. Despite being told that stimuli
contained by a ‘‘big’’ and ‘‘small’’ letters, he reported
only the small letter on 19/20 trials when shown hierar-
chical stimuli in which a single large letter was com-
posed of a number of smaller, different letters (16); cf.,
Navon, 1977); on one trial he failed to report any letter.
K.E. generally performed well in identifying the ori-
entation of a single stimulus (cf., Robertson & Treisman,
2006; Robertson et al., 1997). He distinguished inverted
from upright faces perfectly on 20 trials. He made 2
errors on 20 trials in which he was asked to determine
whether a letter was correctly oriented or mirror image
reversed. He incorrectly accepted as correct a reversed
‘‘s’’ and ‘‘k.’’ Color processing was preserved; he named
five different color patches (yellow, blue, red, green, or
Figure 2. A high ventricular T2-weighted image demonstrating
subcortical white matter abnormalities, a left parietal infarction and the
residual effects of a right parietal intraparenchymal hemorrhage.
Figure 1. Reconstructions of K.E.’s right and left hemisphere lesions.
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orange) accurately when presented individually in ran-
dom sequence (30/30).
Finally, K.E.’s performance was inf luenced by the
semantic category of the objects in the array. Like B.P.
(Coslett & Saffran, 1991), he reported both items cor-
rectly significantly more reliably on trials on which both
stimuli were drawn from the same semantic category
(e.g., tools or animals) as compared to trials on which
stimuli were drawn from different semantic categories;
this was true for both pictures and words. Furthermore,
as described in a separate manuscript (Coslett and Lie,
in press), he exhibited profound repetition blindness
with words, pictures, and letters. When presented an ar-
ray containing different letters (e.g., ‘‘b n’’) he reported
both letters correctly on 47% of trials, whereas he re-
ported both letters correctly on same letter trials (e.g.,
‘‘p p’’) on only 4% of trials.
Experimental Investigations
Methods are described below; unless otherwise stated,
stimuli were presented on 12.7  17.8 cm blank white
cards. Words and line drawings were either horizontally
or vertically aligned and were separated by approximate-
ly 7 cm. Targets subtended approximately 28 of visual
angle. Cards were presented in K.E.’s midline for an
unlimited period. As noted below, other stimuli were
presented on a monitor controlled by a Macintosh com-
puter. We note that in preliminary testing, K.E.’s perfor-
mance was quite similar with stimuli presented on cards
or a computer monitor. Although he was more likely to
report the right stimulus with horizontal (side by side)
arrays and the top stimulus with vertical arrays (see be-
low), overall performance with vertical and horizontal
arrays was quite similar.
It should be emphasized that efforts were made to
maximize performance on all tasks. K.E. was told that
two stimuli were present on each card. On those trials
on which only one target was reported, he was re-
minded that a second target was present and was en-
couraged to continue searching. He was given unlimited
time on most tasks and consistently instructed to search
for the second stimulus.
EXPERIMENT 1: PREATTENTIVE AND
ATTENTION-REQUIRING VISUAL SEARCH
Experiment 1 was performed to assess K.E.’s visual search.
The experiment was motivated by accounts that distin-
guish between ‘‘preattentive’’ and ‘‘attention-requiring’’
processes in visual perception (e.g., Treisman, 1998;
Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989; Treisman &
Gormican, 1988). On Treisman’s FIT, for example, visual
features such as color and orientation are assumed to
be processed in parallel in specialized cortical regions;
visual attention, operating at the level of the Master Map
of Locations, is assumed to be crucial for linking features
distributed across the different feature maps. On such
an account, ‘‘preattentive’’ search for a feature such as
the color red is fast and efficient because a response
can be generated simply on the basis of activation at the
appropriate feature map; that is, no linking of features
is required.
Conjunction search, in contrast, requires attention be-
cause, in this instance, the relevant features are repre-
sented at multiple sites in the feature map; in order
to determine whether a conjunction of the relevant
features is present, the subject must not only register
activity in the feature maps but also determine if the
features are in the same location, a process that is as-
sumed to require a limited-capacity interrogation of the
master map of locations. Thus, the detection of a green
‘‘S’’ in an array of blue ‘‘X’’s and red ‘‘T’’s could be per-
formed without spatial attention as the target is unique
with respect to both color and form. In contrast, the
detection of a red ‘‘T’’ in an array of red ‘‘S’’s and green
‘‘T’’s requires attention to determine if the features
‘‘red’’ and ‘‘T’’ are represented at the same location.
Some (e.g., McCrea et al., 2006; Humphreys et al., 2000;
Robertson et al., 1997; Friedman-Hill et al., 1995), but not
all (e.g., Coslett & Saffran, 1991), simultanagnosic sub-
jects produce illusory conjunctions in visual search tasks.
Methods
K.E.’s ‘‘preattentive’’ search was assessed by asking him
to indicate if a green ‘‘S’’ was present in a nine-item
arraying. On target present trials, there were four blue
‘‘X’’s and four red ‘‘T’’s in addition to the green ‘‘S.’’ On
target-absent trials there were either five blue ‘‘X’’s and
four red ‘‘T’’s or four blue ‘‘X’’s and five red ‘‘T’’s. Each
letter was 2 cm in height. Letters were randomly arrayed
on 10  15.5 cm white cards. Cards were presented
on a table in K.E.’s midline at a viewing distance of ap-
proximately 40 cm. Stimuli were presented until K.E.
responded. There were 24 target-present and 24 target-
absent trials presented in random sequence. The target
was present in each quadrant of the card on six trials.
Attention-requiring search was assessed by asking K.E.
to indicate if a red ‘‘T’’ was present in an array of red
‘‘X’’s and green ‘‘T’’s. On target-present trials there
were four red ‘‘X’’s and four green ‘‘T’’s as well as the
red ‘‘T.’’ On target-absent trials there were either five
red ‘‘X’’s and four green ‘‘T’’s or four red ‘‘X’’s and five
green ‘‘T’’s. There were 24 target-present and 24 target-
absent trials presented in random sequence. The target
was present in each quadrant of the card on six trials.
There were nine items in each array and a target was
present on half of the trials.
Results
K.E. responded perfectly on 24 trials when the green
‘‘S’’ was present and made only one error on 24 trials
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in which the target was not present (98% correct), sug-
gesting that ‘‘preattentive’’ search was at least relatively
preserved.
In the attention-requiring search, K.E. responded cor-
rectly on 21/24 (87%) target-present trials. He responded
correctly on only 6/24 (25%) of target-absent trials. Overall,
he responded accurately on 27/48 trials (56%), a perfor-
mance that did not differ from chance. Additionally,
he was as likely to report seeing a red ‘‘T’’ when it was
absent as when it was present (18/24 vs. 21/24; Fisher’s
Exact Test, p = .4614). Finally, although the data are not
presented here in the interests of brevity, we note that
array size was not critical; quite similar performance was
obtained in a very similar visual search task involving five-
item arrays.
Discussion
Although able to report the presence or absence of a
single instance of a visual feature in an array quite reliably
(98% correct), K.E. was at chance in judging if a target
defined by the conjunction of visual features was present.
In this respect, K.E. is similar to simultanagnosic patients
reported by Robertson and colleagues (Robertson et al.,
1997; Friedman-Hill et al., 1995), McCrea et al. (2006),
and Humphreys et al. (2000).
One potential account of these data is that K.E.’s false
alarms (reporting a stimuli that was not present) is at-
tributable to a failure of the process that binds features
processed in distinct cortical regions into a coherent
perceptual unit (Treisman, 1998). Such an account was
invoked to explain the presence of illusory conjunctions
in another simultanagnosic (R.M.; Robertson et al., 1997;
Friedman-Hill et al., 1995). We have recently proposed a
closely related account for yet another simultanagnosic
patient (McCrea et al., 2006) who produced frequent
illusory conjunctions on a visual search task.
There is an alternative account of illusory conjunc-
tions that should also be considered; if K.E. is unable to
simultaneously perceive both attributes of the stimuli in
Experiment 1—that is, shape and color—but responds
on the basis of either letter shape or color alone, one
would expect him to perform well on the ‘‘preattentive’’
task, in which the target is unique with respect to shape
and color, but to produce false alarms on the attention-
requiring task, in which the correct location of both
attributes must be registered. Thus, if K.E. is unable to
perceive object form (letter shape) and surface features
of the stimulus (e.g., color), one would expect him to
indicate that a target is present on both target-present
and target-absent conditions as the target shape (‘‘T’’)
is, in fact, present on both types of trials. On this
account, illusory conjunctions would not reflect a mis-
combination of perceptual information but rather a
failure to perceive all of the relevant visual features. This
possibility, which was raised by preliminary clinical ob-
servations, was addressed in Experiments 2 to 4.
EXPERIMENT 2: REPORT OF WORD IDENTITY
AND INK COLOR FOR COLOR WORDS
Data from Experiment 1 suggest that K.E.’s illusory con-
junctions may not reflect the miscombination of visual
information present in the array but rather the inability
to perceive all of the visual attributes of the stimuli. If
this were true, one would expect K.E. to be unable to
report two attributes of the same object. This prediction
was tested in Experiment 2, in which K.E. was asked to
name a single written word and to name the color of the
ink in which the word was written.
We note that this experiment differs in a crucial respect
from most previous investigations of K.E. and other simul-
tanagnosic subjects in which subjects are typically asked
to report stimuli that differ with respect to locations. In
those cases, the failure to report multiple different items
in an array is readily interpretable as dysfunction in the
mapping of spatial location. Asking K.E. to report two at-
tributes of the same stimulus minimizes task demands
with respect to the shift of attention or the integrity of
spatial representations: Words can only be identified by
virtue of processing the ink. The ability to name a word
accompanied by a failure to name the color of the ink
cannot be attributed to an inability to perceive the ink.
Methods
K.E. was shown letter strings consisting of four to seven
letters and asked to name the stimuli. Letter strings were
presented either printed on 12.7  17.8 cm white cards or
on a monitor until K.E. responded. Letter strings were
written in different color inks; in different blocks of trials,
K.E. was asked to first read the word and then name the
color or first name the color ink and then read the word.
In different testing sessions, two different types of stim-
uli were employed. First, the words red, blue, green, and
yellow were employed. The words were presented in dif-
ferent color inks (red, blue, green, and yellow). Each word
was presented in each color six times for a total of 96 trials.
A similar task was administered in which K.E. was
asked to name six high-frequency nouns presented in
red, yellow, green, and blue ink. The 24 stimuli were
presented in random sequence on two occasions. On
the first occasion, he was asked to name the word and
then the color, whereas on the second occasion, he was
asked to name the ink color and then the word. For
both types of words, stimuli were presented with a
monitor until he responded. He was always asked to
name the color of the ink and the identity of the word
while the stimulus was still in view.
In preliminary testing, K.E.’s ability to name the colors
employed in the task was assessed by presenting 2.5 
2.5 cm patches of the same colors in which the words
were presented. Color patches were presented on a mon-
itor until he responded. He named the color correctly
on 36/36 trials.
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Results
When asked to name the color words and then the color of
the ink, K.E. correctly named the word on 47/48 trials; he
always failed to name the ink color. When asked to name
the color of the ink and then the word, he always named
the word (48/48 correct) but never named the color. On all
trials, K.E. explicitly stated that he did not see a color; he
‘‘assumed’’ that the words were written in black ink but
stated that he did not recall seeing black ink (Table 1).
Data from high-frequency nouns were similar. Collaps-
ing across the two sessions, he correctly named 30/48
(63%) of the words; on only two occasions, both when
asked to name the color first, did he report seeing a color.
He named the color as well as the word correctly on
those trials. On 46/48 trials, he insisted that no color was
present and said the words ‘‘must be in black.’’ Most
reading errors were visually based (e.g., HOUSE read as
‘‘hose’’). It should be noted that he was always asked to
name the color of the ink while the stimulus was still
present. His inability to name the color of the ink,
therefore, cannot be attributed to a failure of memory.
Discussion
K.E. consistently reported the name of the word wheth-
er instructed to name the word or the color in which it
was presented. Critically, on only two of 144 trials did he
acknowledge that a color was present. This performance
is consistent with the hypothesis that K.E. was able to
‘‘see’’ only one attribute of the object. The implications
of these findings will be discussed below.
When instructed to name the color of the ink in which
the word was written, K.E. continued to report the
word; as he was perfect on a control condition in which
he was simply asked to name color patches, we believe
that his failure to report the color reflected the fact that
naming the word is more automatic than identifying the
color of the ink. We sought to address this possibility in
the following experiment in which stimuli without a
prepotent response were employed.
EXPERIMENT 3: NAMING TWO ATTRIBUTES
OF A FORM
Methods
Stimuli for the experiment included four objects gener-
ated by crossing the variables of shape (circle, square)
and stripes (present/absent; see Figure 3). Circles were
2.5 cm in diameter and squares were 2.5  2.5 cm. The
contours and stripes were drawn with approximately
2-mm-wide lines on a 12.7  17.8 cm white card.
On 32 trials, K.E. was asked to name the stimulus
shape and then to indicate if stripes were present; on
another 32 trials, he was asked to indicate if stripes were
present and then to state the shape of the stimulus. On
all trials he was asked to name both the shape of the
stimulus and whether the stimulus had stripes or not
while the stimulus was in view. Stimuli were presented
in 4 blocks of 16 randomized trials using an ABBA
design, in which the order of report for shape and
stripes was counterbalanced. All blocks of trials were
administered the same day. Stimuli were in view while
K.E. attempted to name the shape and indicate whether
stripes were present.
Results
When asked to name the shape first, K.E. named the
shape correctly on 31/32 trials; on one trial he correctly
indicated that stripes were present but denied seeing
a shape. When asked to first indicate if stripes were
present, he responded accurately regarding the pres-
ence or absence of stripes on 32/32 trials but named the
shape correctly on only two trials. Thus, he reported
both attributes correctly on only 2/64 trials. He correctly
reported the perceptual feature that was to be reported
first on 63/64 trials, whereas he reported the perceptual
feature to be reported second on only 3/64 trials.
K.E. was explicitly instructed to indicate the shape as
well as the presence or absence of stripes on all trials.
He clearly understood the instructions as indicated by
his ability to verbalize the task demands and the fact that
Table 1. Two Attributes of One Object: Words
Name Ink Color Read Word
Color words 0% (0/96) 99% (95/96)
High-frequency words 4% (2/48) 63% (30/48)
Figure 3. The four stimuli employed in Experiment 3.
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on two trials he was able to report both attributes. On
this and other tasks, K.E. was encouraged to guess on
most trials; he was quite reluctant to do so, typically
saying ‘‘that’s all I see.’’
Discussion
Once again, K.E. was able to report only one attribute of
a visual stimulus on the vast majority of trials. In contrast
to Experiment 3, there was no prepotent response with
these unfamiliar stimuli; K.E. reported the attribute to be
attended first on 98% of trials. Thus, in this experiment,
the visual attribute that K.E. reported was influenced not
by the perceptual salience of the attribute but by task
demands. Once again, however, the fundamental deficit
appears to be the inability to direct attention to more
than one visual attribute at a time or the inability to shift
from one type of visual representation to another.
If K.E. ‘‘saw’’ only one feature of the stimulus, one
might expect him to name the attended feature well but
to perform at chance (50% correct) with respect to the
second feature. K.E. performed significantly worse than
chance when naming the second attribute; his errors on
this and other tasks on which he was asked to report two
attributes of a stimulus were omissions. We attribute this
to K.E.’s reluctance to guess. As in the previous experi-
ment, he was asked to report both stimulus shape and
whether it had stripes while the stimulus was in view; his
deficit cannot be attributed to a failure of memory.
EXPERIMENT 4: REPORT OF TWO
ATTRIBUTES OF AN AUDITORY STIMULUS
This experiment was performed to address the possi-
bility that K.E.’s failure to report both attributes of a
stimulus reflected either a failure to understand the task
requirements or an impairment in other processing
domains (e.g., working memory). To address this issue,
K.E. was asked to report two attributes of an auditory
stimulus.
Methods
Fifty-six sentences of four to eight words were read
aloud by either a male or female examiner standing be-
hind the patient. K.E. was asked to repeat the sentence
and then to indicate the gender of the speaker. Sen-
tences were randomized with respect to gender.
Results
K.E. repeated all sentences accurately. Of greatest signif-
icance in this context, K.E. reported the gender correctly
on 79% (44/56) of trials. Despite the fact that attempts
were made to use gender-neutral sentences (e.g., ‘‘sew’’
and ‘‘threw’’ were not used), most errors appeared to
reflect the influence of gender stereotypes. Thus, he
tended to respond ‘‘male’’ to sentences dealing with ac-
tion. The task was administered to two age-matched nor-
mal controls; one subject performed perfectly, whereas
the second subject made one error (98% correct).
Discussion
K.E. performed abnormally on the task, erring on 21% of
trials on a task in which normal subjects were at ceiling.
Nonetheless, it is clear that K.E. was substantially more
accurate on this task (79% correct) than on tasks on
which he was asked to report two attributes of a visual
stimulus (3% correct in Experiment 3). There are several
possible explanations for these data. One possibility is
that K.E. suffers from a modality-independent deficit in
processing two attributes of any stimulus. Although a
modality-independent attentional ‘‘bottleneck’’ that pre-
cludes the report of more than one attribute of any
stimulus cannot be definitively excluded, we believe that
it is unlikely to be the primary deficit causing K.E.’s dra-
matic impairment as it does not account for the dis-
crepancy with visual as compared to auditory stimuli.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the striking discrepan-
cy in performance with visual as compared to auditory
stimuli is attributable to differences in task demands.
Whereas both tasks were regarded as quite easy by
control subjects, controls judged the task from Experi-
ment 4 to be more difficult because it required one to
attend at the time of stimulus presentation and hold on
to the information until ready to respond.
We contend that K.E.’s deficit demonstrated in Exper-
iment 4 is consistent with our hypothesis that he is un-
able to bind information computed in the ventral and
dorsal visual systems. In previous work we have dem-
onstrated that performance on tasks that appear to have
no explicit spatial dimension—for example, language—
may be influenced by spatial factors (Coslett, 1999;
Coslett, Schwartz, Goldberg, Haas, & Perkins, 1993; see
also Lie, McCrae, & Coslett, 2006). On the basis of these
data, we argued that stimuli with no apparent spatial
dimension are marked for location; furthermore, we
argued that a disruption of the binding of this location
information to language and other sensorimotor sys-
tems may underlie these spatial effects (Coslett, 1999).
Thus, K.E.’s impairment in the report of both attributes
of an auditory stimulus may reflect a failure to bind
location information to language systems.
Finally, the fact that K.E. reported both attributes on
79% of trials strongly suggests that his failure to do so on
tasks involving visual stimuli is not attributable to a failure
to understand task demands. We note that this con-
clusion was supported by data from another experiment
that are not presented in detail for the sake of brevity.
K.E. was asked to imagine that he was looking at an ob-
ject and to report both its color and relative size (‘‘Is it
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larger than a softball?’’). He answered both questions
correctly for 15/16 objects, demonstrating that his impair-
ment on the tasks described above cannot be attributed
to a failure to understand the task, impaired working
memory, or loss of knowledge of object attributes.
Discussion of Experiments 2 to 4
Data from the preceding three experiments demonstrate
that K.E. was unable to report more than one attribute of
a visually presented object. Thus, what appear to be
illusory conjunction errors reflecting the miscombination
of features in the array (e.g., the color red and the form
‘‘T’’) may be attributable to the inability to consciously
register both visual features rather than a deficit in the
binding of low-level visual information.
In this context, K.E.’s relatively normal object recog-
nition is relevant. If K.E. suffered from a low-level deficit
in the binding of visual feature information, one would
not expect him to identify visually presented stimuli as
this process necessarily entails the integration of visual
feature information computed in early visual cortices.
In order to accommodate this apparent paradox, Shalev
and Humphreys (2002) and Cooper and Humphreys
(2000) suggested that the ventral and dorsal systems dif-
fer with respect to the manner in which spatial informa-
tion is employed: The former computes spatial relations
between the features of a candidate object, whereas
the latter computes the spatial relations between candi-
date objects. This account does not eliminate the bind-
ing problem but rather defers it; the visual system must
ultimately integrate information about object identity
and location. Thus, we suggest that K.E. suffers from
an impaired ability to bind visual information but that
the impairment arises at a stage of processing after
which visual feature information is integrated. More spe-
cifically, we contend that K.E. is unable to link object
identity and other stimulus attributes computed in the
ventral visual system to the spatial representations com-
puted by the dorsal visual system.
The striking impairment in the ability to report more
than one attribute of a visual display exhibited by K.E.
argues that the linking of visual information computed
in the dorsal and ventral visual streams is a limited-
capacity operation. The hypothesis that K.E.’s bilateral
posterior parietal lesions caused a pathologic reduction
in the resources necessary for the binding of information
computed in the dorsal and ventral streams may take at
least two closely related forms. On one account, the
critical deficit underlying K.E.’s simultanagnosia is the
number of linkages that can be maintained between
information computed in the ventral stream to spatial
representation computed in the dorsal visual stream.
Thus, K.E. may be able to sustain only one linkage, unless
there is top-down support that reduces the binding re-
sources required. Consistent with the claim that top-down
support plays an important role in K.E.’s performance, on
tasks described elsewhere (Coslett & Lie, in press), K.E.
exhibited an effect of object identity on report of two-item
arrays. He was significantly more likely to report semanti-
cally related items but failed to report both items if they
were identical (repetition blindness).
Another possible explanation of K.E.’s performance is
that he is slow in disengaging from one type of repre-
sentation and shifting to another. Data suggesting that
subjects with neglect (Ptak & Schnider, 2006; Posner,
Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984) and simultanagnosia
(Pavese, Coslett, Saffran, & Buxbaum, 2002) may be im-
paired at disengaging attention from one location to
shift to another location have been reported by several
investigators. One might argue that K.E. also exhibits a
disengage deficit of a somewhat different type—that is,
unlike previous subjects who were impaired at disen-
gaging attention from a location, K.E. may be unable to
disengage from one type of representation (e.g., color)
to shift to another type of representation (e.g., shape).
On this account, the ability to report two attributes of
an object may not require that multiple representations
be simultaneously linked to a spatial representation but
rather that the system be able to shift quickly and ef-
ficiently from one linkage to another. This distinction
may be illustrated by considering Experiment 4, in which
K.E. was asked to report both the stimulus shape and
whether stripes were present. On the first account,
K.E.’s inability to report both the shape and the pres-
ence/absence of stripes would reflect an inability to
simultaneously bind the shape to a location while also
binding the stripes to a location. On the disengage ac-
count, the deficit would be attributable to the fact that,
once having directed attention to a particular attribute
of the stimulus (e.g., shape), he is unable to shift atten-
tion to process another attribute of the stimulus (e.g.,
stripes). We recognize that these accounts are closely
related and not mutually exclusive.
Finally, data from Experiments 2 and 3 strongly argue
that K.E.’s deficit is not a failure to register visual in-
formation or a failure of top-down control of visual pro-
cessing. As noted above, he was unable to report the
color of the ink that formed the word; as the ink itself
constituted the stimulus, his failure to report the color
cannot be attributed to a failure to perceive the colored
ink. K.E.’s performance on the stripes absent condition
of Experiment 3 is relevant with respect to the question
of the top-down control of visual processing. K.E. per-
formed perfectly when asked to report whether stripes
were present when presented either a circle or square
without stripes. That is, when asked to attend to the
stripes, he correctly reported their absence but was then
unable to ‘‘see’’ the shape. The fact that he did not
simply report stimulus shape on these trials suggests
that, even in the absence of the relevant stimulus, visual
attention was not captured by the visual stimulus that
was present; in this regard, K.E. is quite different from
other subjects with simultanagnosia who appear to be
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unable to control the location in space to which atten-
tion is allocated (cf., Pavese et al., 2002).
The hypothesis that K.E.’s inability to report more
than one object or more than one attribute of the same
object is attributable to a failure to bind information com-
puted in the ventral, object recognition systems with lo-
cation information computed in the dorsal stream makes
a specific prediction regarding the role of unreported
information. This account assumes that processing in the
ventral stream is preserved. On this account, one would
expect visual information regarding object identity and
other stimulus attributes, such as color, to be adequately
represented even if not reported. If this is the case, one
might expect this information to influence performance
despite the fact that the information is not available for
report. We explored this possibility in a series of three
experiments.
EXPERIMENT 5: PROCESSING OF
UNREPORTED INK COLOR
A variation of the Stroop test was performed in which
K.E. was asked to read aloud color words written in the
same (congruous) or different (incongruous) color.
Methods
The four color words and the ink colors described in
Experiment 3 were used (red, blue, green, yellow in
both instances). Eight blocks of 48 trials were prepared;
in each block, 24 stimuli were color congruent and 24
were incongruent. For each word, the time from stimu-
lus presentation to naming was recorded by the exam-
iner; the examiner depressed the space bar of a
keyboard as soon as K.E. responded. (A voice-activated
relay was considered impractical because of K.E.’s ten-
dency to vocalize prior to responding.) The examiner
could not see the monitor and was therefore blinded
with respect to the accuracy of response. Sessions were
tape recorded for later scoring of accuracy. Four blocks
were administered in each of two sessions 1 week apart.
Results
K.E. read both congruous and incongruous color words
accurately (99% and 97% correct, respectively). Seven of
eight errors involved misreading the word ‘‘yellow’’ as
‘‘follow’’; six of the seven errors were on incongruent
trials. For each block, mean RTs for correct trials for
both the congruous and incongruous trials were calcu-
lated. Although, as in Experiment 2, K.E. never acknowl-
edged seeing a color, RTs on incongruous trials were
significantly longer than on congruous trials [2190 ±
602 msec. vs. 1720 ± 293 msec; t(7) = 3.32, p = .006].
The implications of these data will be discussed below.
EXPERIMENT 6: PREFERENCE FOR
CONGRUOUS WORDS
To further explore the extent to which unreported per-
ceptual attributes influenced performance, a forced-
choice task was administered in which K.E. was not
required to explicitly name any attribute of the stimulus
but simply to indicate which of two exemplars was ‘‘bet-
ter’’ or ‘‘preferable.’’
Methods
Stimuli included the four color words used in Experi-
ment 3. On each trial, the color word was presented
twice, once in the congruous ink and once in an in-
congruous color. Each word was presented seven times.
Words were horizontally aligned on 13  17 cm cards.
The congruous exemplar was on the right on half of the
trials. K.E. was asked to indicate which of the exemplars
he ‘‘preferred’’ or was ‘‘better.’’ After responding he
was also asked to identify the ink color of the stimuli.
This experiment was administered 6 weeks after the task
described in Experiment 2.
Results
Although he explicitly denied seeing the ink color on all
trials and was utterly unable to explain his selection, he
‘‘preferred’’ the congruous stimulus on 22/28 trials, a
performance that is substantially higher than chance
( p < .01). On five trials in which he preferred the in-
congruous stimulus, the stimulus was on the right. He
never reported the color of the ink, always stating that
the words were presented in ‘‘black.’’
EXPERIMENT 7: NAMING OF COLORED
LINE DRAWINGS
This experiment was performed to determine whether
the color of an object influenced naming of line draw-
ings. We note that in preliminary testing in which K.E.
was asked to name appropriately colored line drawings
and then their colors, he named the objects correctly on
approximately 85% of trials but named the color of the
drawing on only approximately 50% of trials. Thus, K.E.
demonstrated a substantial deficit in the processing the
color of an object despite the fact that he performed
well in object identification. The interpretation of these
data was complicated by the fact that many common ob-
jects have a strong color association (tomatoes are red,
lemons are yellow, etc.). Thus, it was unclear whether
K.E. perceived the color of the object or responded on
the basis of stored knowledge of the color of objects.
In order to assess whether K.E. was able to perceive
both the identity and color of line drawings he was
asked to name appropriately (e.g., a yellow lemon) and
inappropriately colored objects (e.g., a blue lemon). We
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reasoned that if K.E. failed to perceive the color, there
would be no difference in object naming as a function
of color. In contrast, if the color of the stimulus was
perceived, he would be more likely to name the appro-
priately colored object.
Methods
Twenty-four line drawings of common objects drawn
from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) corpus as
well as the Boston Naming Test served as stimuli. Two
versions of each object were prepared. One was gener-
ated by hand-coloring the 24 items in a naturalistic color,
whereas the second exemplar was colored in an unnat-
ural manner. Two blocks of stimuli were generated, each
of which contained 12 appropriately and 12 inappropri-
ately colored items. Each item occurred once in each
block of stimuli. Line drawings were pasted onto 13 
17 cm cards. Items were presented in K.E.’s midline until
he responded. Blocks of stimuli were presented 1 week
apart. K.E. was asked to name each item.
Results
K.E. named appropriately colored items significantly
more reliably than inappropriately colored items (19/
24 vs. 7/24; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .0012). After the
blocks of trials were administered, K.E. was asked if
he noticed anything unusual about the color of the
stimuli; he stated that he did not remember seeing any
colors.
Discussion
In experiments employing both words and line drawings
of common objects, K.E.’s performance was influenced
by a stimulus attribute of which he was unaware. This
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that K.E.’s im-
pairment is not in the registration of visual feature infor-
mation but arises at a ‘‘higher’’ level. At least for K.E., we
suggest that the deficit represents a restriction in bind-
ing visual information to spatial representations and, as
a consequence, a failure of awareness.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
K.E. exhibited profound simultanagnosia and optic ataxia
in the context of bilateral parietal lobe lesions (as well
as white matter hyperintensities). Although he report-
ed ‘‘illusory conjunctions’’ of color and form in Exper-
iment 1, subsequent experiments demonstrated that he
was not only unable to reliably identify more than one
stimulus in an array but was also unable to report more
than one attribute of a single stimulus. These findings
suggest that apparent illusory conjunctions were attrib-
utable to an inability to consciously process more than
one attribute of a stimulus rather than the miscombina-
tion of two stimuli present in the array. Finally, we dem-
onstrated in a series of experiments that the perceptual
attributes that K.E. was unable to report were, in fact,
perceived. We suggest that K.E.’s performance has im-
portant implications for accounts of normal visual pro-
cessing and the relationship between the ‘‘what’’ and
‘‘where/how to’’ systems. First, these data suggest that
the conscious perception of arrays is crucially dependent
on a limited-capacity procedure by which information
computed in the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘where/how to’’ systems is
linked. Disruption of this limited-capacity binding system,
we suggest, causes K.E.’s simultanagnosia.
On this account, the procedures by which objects are
recognized are at least relatively preserved. Consistent
with this claim, K.E. reliably recognized familiar objects
and words for which substantial top-down support is
available. We recognize that K.E.’s impairment in recog-
nition of unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., nonwords) represents
one potential objection to the claim that the ventral sys-
tem is preserved. The resolution of this apparent para-
dox comes from an appreciation of the relative roles of
the dorsal and ventral stream in object recognition. As
has been argued by a number of investigators (McCrea
et al., 2006; Robertson & Treisman, 2006; Humphreys
et al., 2000; Humphreys & Riddoch, 1995), the dorsal
and ventral visual systems differ fundamentally with
respect to the spatial relations they compute. Whereas
the dorsal system appears to compute the relations
between objects, probably in an egocentric spatial co-
ordinate system, the ventral system generates a spatial
representation in which the relations between elements
of the object are represented (Robertson & Treisman,
2006; Humphreys et al., 2000).
Stored representations for familiar objects are likely
to facilitate the computation of the relationships be-
tween elements of an object. In contrast, unfamiliar
stimuli are likely to be segmented by early visual pro-
cesses into multiple discrete elements. The dorsal visual
system is crucial for the computation of the relationship
between the relatively discrete elements. For example,
for nonwords there is no stored word form information
to facilitate the computation of the relationships be-
tween elements of the stimulus; as a consequence, the
nonword may be perceived as a series of discrete
elements rather than a single unit. As the computation
of the relationships between discrete elements in a
manner that can contact the ventral stream is regarded
as a crucial element of simultanagnosia by many in-
vestigators (Robertson, 2003; Humphreys et al., 2000;
Robertson et al., 1997), we suggest that his deficit in
recognition of unfamiliar stimuli is not inconsistent with
the view that the ventral processing stream is relatively
preserved.
Although a disruption of the dorsal system with a loss
of spatial information may represent the fundamental de-
ficit in many subjects with simultanagnosia (cf., McCrea
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et al., 2006; Robertson et al., 1997), we suggest that K.E.’s
deficit cannot be adequately explained on this basis for a
number of reasons. First, the apparent absence of true
illusory conjunctions is consistent with the hypothesis
that the initial coding of spatial location is relatively
preserved; we note that the presence of illusory con-
junctions has been taken by many investigators as evi-
dence of a loss of the ability to mark the location of visual
information (McCrea et al., 2006; Humphreys et al., 2000;
Robertson et al., 1997). Second, it is not clear that a loss
of spatial information would give rise to K.E.’s most strik-
ing and, to our knowledge, heretofore unreported deficit,
an inability to ‘‘see’’ more than one attribute of the same
object. Thus, K.E. is unable to both name a word and
report the color ink in which the word was presented
despite the fact that the ink constitutes the word. The
mechanism by which loss of spatial information would
lead to a failure to report one of the stimulus attributes is
not clear.
Finally, the demonstration that K.E.’s performance
is influenced by semantics is also relevant. Given the
hierarchical but highly interactive nature of the visual
system, one might expect stored information regarding
an object’s shape or form to at least partially compen-
sate for a deficit in the precision with which visual
features are registered, thereby facilitating object/word
recognition. The semantic effects on two object ar-
rays, however, are not readily attributable to such a facil-
itation. Indeed, we (Coslett & Lie, in press; Coslett &
Saffran, 1991) and others (Ptak & Schnider, 2005) have
argued that the effects of semantic relatedness on report
of two items in an array demonstrate that the objects
have been processed to a high level. Thus, the fact that
K.E. reports both items more reliably when shown a pig
and a bear as compared to a pig and a hammer suggests
that both stimuli contact stored information regarding
object form and identity.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AWARENESS
We have argued that K.E.’s inability to ‘‘see’’ more than
one object or more than one attribute of the same
object is not attributable to a deficit in the processing
of visual feature information, the integration of visual
feature information into structural descriptions, or an
inability to mark the location of visual percepts but
instead reflects a pathologic restriction in the ability to
bind information computed in the dorsal and ventral
visual systems. Implicit in this account is the assumption
that the ability to report perceptual attributes requires
that those attributes be linked to information specifying
the location of the stimulus. Several lines of evidence
support this claim.
In a review of behavioral and imaging studies of the
neural basis of awareness, Kanwisher (2001) concluded
that the binding of activated perceptual attributes with a
representation that specifies the time and place in which
a stimulus appears is a necessary prerequisite for aware-
ness. Additionally, studies of subjects with brain lesions
support this contention (Coslett, 1999; Berti & Rizzolatti,
1992; see Driver, Vuilleumier, Eimer, & Rees, 2001; Rees
et al., 2001 for reviews).
The loci of K.E.’s lesions are also of relevance in this
context. Although conclusions regarding the anatomic
basis of K.E.’s deficit must be tempered by the presence
of generalized white matter increased signal and the
presence of small left frontal and temporal infarctions,
K.E.’s simultanagnosia was, we believe, primarily attrib-
utable to the bilateral posterior parietal lesions involving
the angular gyrus. These lesions were not only the most
extensive of his infarctions but simultanagnosia was first
noted at the time of the right parietal hemorrhage.
Studies of the anatomy of the inferior parietal cortex
are consistent with its putative role in binding location
information and object identity. For example, Watson,
Valenstein, Day, and Heilman (1994) suggested that
the inferior parietal cortex represents the human ana-
logue of the monkey temporal polysensory cortex that,
when damaged, gives rise to neglect. In the same vein,
Boussaoud, Ungerleider, and Desimone (1990) argued
that the superior temporal polysensory region should
be regarded as a component of a ‘‘third stream’’ as it
is interconnected with both dorsal and ventral streams
(see also Milner & Goodale, 1995). Rizzolatti and Matelli
(2003) recently argued that the dorsal stream should be
divided into the ‘‘dorsal dorsal’’ and ‘‘ventral dorsal’’
systems with the latter being crucial for skilled action
and action recognition. Broadly consistent with this view,
Buxbaum, Kyle, and Menon (2005) recently proposed
the ‘‘Two Action System’’ according to which the in-
ferior parietal lobule, by virtue of its reciprocal con-
nections between the superior parietal lobule and the
temporal lobe, serves to integrate spatio-motor informa-
tion with object knowledge to generate skilled hand–
object interactions. Finally, Fridman et al. (2006) have
argued for a dorsal–ventral gradient in the parietal lobe,
such that meaning and memory assume a greater role in
the representations computed by the parietal lobe as
one approaches the ventral stream. In summary then, a
number of lines of evidence are consistent with the view
that the inferior parietal lobule is crucial for the binding
of the dorsal and ventral streams, perhaps by virtue of
generating representations in which object location and
identity are indexed.
We do not claim that K.E.’s visual system lacks in-
formation regarding the location of visual stimuli and
even objects. Several investigators have reported simul-
tanagnosic subjects who exhibited implicit knowledge
of object location but were at chance in reporting the
location of stimuli that they had identified (Humphreys
& Riddoch, 2003; Robertson et al., 1997). As suggested
by Humphreys and Riddoch (2003) (see also Heinke
& Humphreys, 2003), implicit knowledge of the loca-
tion of objects may reflect interactions between object-
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and space-based representations in early visual cortices.
The inability to offer explicit information about object
identity, attributes, or location in patients with simul-
tanagnosia reflects, we suggest, a failure to link spatial
representations computed in the parietal lobe to infor-
mation about object identity and perceptual attributes
computed in the temporal lobe.
A final issue concerns the implications of the data
from K.E. for the syndrome of simultanagnosia. Balint
(1909) attributed the disorder to impaired visual atten-
tion. He emphasized that his patient’s visual fields were
full, suggesting that the deficit was not readily attributed
to a failure to register visual information. Many subse-
quent investigators have suggested that simultanagnosia
is attributable to impaired visual attention (Humphreys
et al., 2000; Robertson et al., 1997; Holmes & Lister,
1916). Consistent with this thesis, a number of patients
have produced illusory conjunctions on visual search
tasks (McCrea et al., 2006; Humphreys et al., 2000;
Robertson et al., 1997; Friedman-Hill et al., 1995) or dem-
onstrated difficulties disengaging attention (Pavese et al.,
2002; Verfaellie & Heilman, 1990).
Although we agree that there is compelling evidence
that simultanagnosia may be associated with deficits in
visual attention in many subjects, we suggest that this
account does not adequately explain the performance
of at least some subjects with simultanagnosia. We
reported a simultanagnosic patient (B.P.) with bilateral
lesions involving the posterior parietal and superior
temporal lobes (Coslett & Saffran, 1991). B.P. did not
produce illusory conjunctions on any task. Additionally,
she exhibited at least relatively normal performance on a
task assessing the ability to shift visual attention (Posner
et al., 1984), demonstrating that she did not manifest a
‘‘disengage’’ deficit. Like K.E., she was significantly more
likely to report both items in an array if they were se-
mantically related. We argued that B.P. was unable to
link information regarding object identity to an egocen-
trically defined location.
Based on the data from K.E. as well as B.P. (Coslett
& Saffran, 1991), we suggest that at least two broad
subtypes of dorsal simultanagnosia may be identified:
one characterized by an early visual attention impair-
ment and a second in which the disorder primarily
reflects a later impairment in binding information com-
puted in the dorsal and ventral visual streams (Coslett
& Chatterjee, 2003). Furthermore, although the ana-
tomic data must be interpreted with caution because
the relevant lesions are large and asymmetric and the
number of patients is small, lesion overlaps suggest that
the behavioral distinction was associated with a dissoci-
ation in the lesion sites. Both patients with ‘‘binding
deficit’’ simultanagnosia exhibited lesions involving the
inferior parietal lobes bilaterally (e.g., Brodmann’s areas
39, 40), whereas both patients with simultanagnosia sec-
ondary to visual attention impairment exhibited lesions
involving the superior parieto-occipital junction bilater-
ally (see Coslett & Chatterjee, 2003 for figures). Data
from other well-studied patients with simultanagnosia
appear to be consistent with this distinction as well.
Humphreys and Riddoch (2003), Shalev and Humphreys
(2002), and Humphreys et al. (2000) reported a patient,
G.K., whose lesion on the right side involved the occipital
lobe. Patient R.M. studied extensively by Robertson
and Treisman (2006) and Robertson et al. (1997) involved
the lateral occipital cortex (Brodmann’s area 19) bilater-
ally as well as portions of the posterior parietal cortex.
Reprint requests should be sent to H. Branch Coslett, Depart-
ment of Neurology, University of Pennsylvania School of Med-
icine, 3400 Spruce St., Philadelphia, PA, 19104, or via e-mail:
hbc@mail.med.upenn.edu.
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